Rwanda Genocide

What Exactly Happened in Rwanda?

Author: Russell Shortt

The Hutu were some of the earliest inhabitants of Rwanda, after the arrival of the Tutsi around the sixteenth century, the Hutu were forced into servitude in a Tutsi-dominated feudal state. Rwanda was one of the last places in Africa to be swallowed up by the European powers during the Scramble for Africa. The Europeans found a state that was divided between Tutsis and Hutus, the divide was described as one of class, where the Tutsis as herders were the upper class and the Hutus as farmers were the lower class. The region of Rwanda and Burundi was given to the German Empire at the Brussels conference of 1890 in return for them renouncing all claims to Uganda. The Germans held back for a number of years, seizing their opportunity during a succession battle for the Rwanda throne, they moved into the region claiming the area in the name of the Kaiser and subsuming it into German East Africa. The German rule was one of little or no control, depending completely on the courts of various local rulers in which they placed agents who attempted to influence proceedings. Germany did not encourage either modernisation or centralisation and favoured the ruling Tutsi class, thinking them more adaptable to European ways and thus granted them ruling positions over the Hutu class. Belgium occupied the territory in 1916, during World War One and was awarded a mandate known as the Ruanda-Urundi (present day Rwanda and Burundi) by the League of Nations in 1923. In 1925, the Belgians formed an administrative area between Ruanda-Urundi and the Belgian Congo. Belgium retained the German policy of strengthening the position of the Tutsis over the Hutus.

Belgium were adamant that the colony would turn a profit, forcing each farmer to plant coffee and installing draconian measures to ensure that it was done, they were assisted in implementing this policy by their Tutsi allies. This alliance had the effect of solidifying the already existing racial divide between the Hutus and Tutsis and it was further exacerbated after eugenic researchers began to produce papers stating that Tutsis had Caucasian heritage and were thus superior to Hutus. Each citizen was issued with an identity card which defined them as legally Hutu or Tutsi. The Belgians gave almost complete political power to the Tutsis who exploited their power over the Hutu majority. In 1946, Ruanda-Urundi became a UN trust territory under Belgian administration . Changes across Africa, post World War II led the Hutus to begin demanding the abolition of political equality and oppression against them. The Belgians encouraged reforms as they feared Hutu unrest would destabilise the region but the Tutsis refused to countenance any change to their ascendant position. An increasingly restive Hutu population encouraged by the Belgian military staged a revolt in November 1959. Massacres ensued with wide ranging reports of between 20,000 and 100,000 Tutsis being killed by Hutus. A UN report stated that the massacres had being engineered in collusion with the Belgian authorities. The 1959 revolution completely transformed the political and social fabric of Rwanda, over 150,000 Tutsis had being sent into exile and those who remained were excluded from all positions of political power. In 1962 the Belgians pulled out and Rwanda became an independent country with the Hutus in the ascendancy.

In December 1963, following an abortive invasion by Tutsi refugees from Burundi, a massive crackdown was launched against the resident Tutsi population which resulted in the deaths of an estimated 12,000. Tutsis began fleeing in their tens of thousands into the neighbouring states of Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and the Congo. A horrendous regime of repression was administered against those who remained behind, resulting in Tutsi militants beginning to organise, labelling themselves as inyensi or cockroaches alluding to their intention to infiltrate the country. In 1973, Major General Juvenal Habyarimana, a Hutu, staged a coup and took control of the country, heralding a new era of relaxed measures towards the Tutsi population. However the regime was corrupt and popular discontent grew throughout the 1980s forcing Habyarimana to implement some political reforms. But the greatest threat to his regime came in October 1990 when over 1,000 Tutsi refugees, calling themselves the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded from Uganda, scoring notable successes before eventually succumbing to government forces bolstered by French, Belgian and Zairian troops. The invasion was used as a pretext for a heightening of repression against the Tutsi population. Habyarimana's government began to recruit Hutu youth militias knows as Interahamwe which contributed to an escalation of ethnic violence. However, Habyarimana began to push for reform and an ending to repressive measures against the Tutsi population, eventually leading him to sign the Arusha Accords in August 1993 which sought to merge the RPF with the national army, the right of return for all Rwandan refugees and the holding of fair elections leading to a democratic government. For his efforts he was assassinated, most likely by Hutu extremists, however the blame was placed upon the Tutsis. A huge propaganda machine was unleashed which encouraged a genocide against the Tutsis and Tutsi sympathisers.

Tragically, it worked and arguably the worst genocide in the history of the world was conducted in Rwanda from April to July 1994 with over 800,000 people being murdered. Hordes of the Interahamwe militia and rebels named the Inkotanyi roamed the country massacring Tutsis and anyone who sympathised with them. There was a RPF battalion stationed in the capital Kigali under the agreements reached at Arusha, they fought their way out of the city and linked up with RPF units in the north. Paul Kagame, the RPF leader organised forces from Tanzania and Uganda to invade the country. Even though aware of the horrific scale of killing, the United Nations refused to get involved, however the RPF successfully took control of the country. Almost two million Hutu refugees fled into neighbouring Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire. They gathered in over thirty camps, many of which were infiltrated by Hutus who had orchestrated the genocide and became extensions of Hutu power in exile. They established brutal control in the camps which were dogged by epidemics of cholera and diarrhoea. An international humanitarian mission was created in an attempt to restore order and stabilise the crises in the camps. Initially, they were quite successful but aid workers began to raise concerns about the presence of armed elements in the camps and the relief operation began to be accused of harbouring the perpetuators of the genocide. Aid organisations began to leave, requesting the UN to intervene and disarm the camps, however their reaction was minimal. The Hutu militants expanded their activities, constantly raiding Rwanda and attacking Tutsis in eastern Zaire. In response, Rwanda began smuggling arms into Zaire to arm the Tutsis residing there. This heightening of tensions led to the First Congo War which led to the fall of Mobutu and the re-naming of Zaire as the Democratic Republic of Congo. The war in Zaire had the immediate effect of emptying the camps and the refugees began returning to Rwanda in their droves.

Article Source: http://www.articlesbase.com/history-articles/what-exactly-happened-in-rwanda-847130.html

About the Author

Russell Shortt is a travel consultant with Exploring Ireland, the leading specialists in customised, private escorted tours, escorted coach tours and independent self drive tours of Ireland. Article source Russell Shortt, http://www.exploringireland.net http://www.visitscotlandtours.com


Serbia and European Union

The relationship with Russia and the progresses of Serbia towards European Integration

Author: Massimiliano Gobbato

BELGRADE, 28 October 2009. The last Report of the European Commission and the recent visit of the Russian President Medvedev have highlighted the strategies and the aims of the Serbian foreign policy. After years of marginality for the well-known vicissitudes which followed the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Serbia quickly begins to emerge as a strategic actor in the Western Balkans. The current foreign policy of Belgrade reminds the one of the former Yugoslavia, although that experience is de facto unrepeatable. Instead, the main challenges are represented by the not yet achieved political maturity and the necessity to improve the conditions of its market economy.

The visit of Medvedev comes just after the ones of Joe Biden, Vice President of the United States in May and Xavier Solana in July. The 20th of October has been the turn of the Russian Minister Medvedev. Received in a flashy way, Medvedev held meetings with the President Boris Tadic, the highest personalities of the government and the parliament, the representatives of the Serb-Orthodox Church. The arrival of Medvedev has been organized for the 65th Anniversary of the Liberation of Belgrade by the JNA (the former Yugoslavian Army).

This event should not appear unusual as Russian elections have been interestingly followed in Serbia and, just after the announcement of the victory of Medvedev, Mr. Kostunica, Serbia's Prime Minister, President Tadic, the leader of the Radical Party Mr. Nikolic and the President of the Socialist Party Mr. Dacic have immediately sent to Moscow they congratulations.
Behind the gaudiness of the event and an outspoken rhetoric of friendship, other more concrete interests are actually at stake. Credits of billion of dollars,  the conclusion of seven  bilateral treaties (from the mutual collaboration in cases of emergency to the economic and cultural cooperation), but overall the negotiations regarding gas issues and  the renewal of the Russian support in the regional and international chessboard were probably the real main matters of discussion.

Medvedev has in fact declared that "the relations between Russia and the Serbia proceed well. The great plans on which we have come to an agreement indicate the strategic character of ours partnership". Medvedev has anyhow added that he is favorable to an EU membership of Belgrade, while Tadic enforced the declarations of his colleague by asserting he took in consideration a series of issues within the Russian-Serbian relations and by stating that for a long time the two countries will have a strong convergence. He concluded adding that Russia today is "an unavoidable factor in international politics".

Serbia and Russia have greatly linked their interests both in political and economical terms. The Russian support to the opposition at the independence of  Kosovo, the acquisition of  the national gas and oil company NIS and the future Serbian-Russian joint venture (51% Gazprom, 49% Srbijagas) for the construction of a gas storage site in Banatski Dvor have irreversibly twisted the relationships between the two parts.

The efforts of Belgrade in order to catch up a more soothed diplomatic climate with the United States and the progressive engagement in inner reforms in order to obtain the candidate status for UE membership makes Serbian foreign politics remember former-Yugoslavia. Already defined as "the diplomacy of the three pillars", notably Russia-Europe-US, (but some experts add a forth one, China), Serbia has visibly the desire to regain a central geopolitical role taking advantage of its strategical position both in geographical and in political-diplomatic terms. Whereas, talks with Europeans and Americans counterpats focus on an effective collaboration of Serbia for the structural overcoming of the political-institutional impasse in Sarajevo and for the good outcome of the European mission EULEX in Kosovo.

Increasing positive remarks came from Brussels. The Irish referendum seemed to scatter some positive effects by lightening the misused rhetorical on the so-called enlargment fatigue. Delic, the Minister for European Integration, declared that now Serbia is closer to the candidacy status. Positively has also reacted the Ambassador of Sweden asserting that "the result of referendum in Ireland offers a stimulus for a renewed engagement of the UE in Serbia". Nevertheless, this positive events will not replace the reforms which Belgrade should further and finalise. Even though the positiveness has been confirmed by the European Commission Report, judged by many analysts as the best received until now, practically no political and institutional path has been established nor for the candidacy and logically neither for the membership.

Article Source: http://www.articlesbase.com/politics-articles/the-relationship-with-russia-and-the-progresses-of-serbia-towards-european-integration-1526372.html

About the Author

Massimiliano Gobbato holds an MA in European Studies from the College of Europe, where he specialised in EU politics and policies. Massimiliano published several articles both as a freelance and as a junior analyst. He previously worked for the Veneto Delegation to the EU and for the newspaper European Voice


Israel and Palestine

Israeli vs Palestine Refugees - In, Out and No Return

Author: Ari Rusila

One element by solving Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the question of refugees or better their right to return. When the "refugee issue" is discussed within the context of the Middle East, people invariably refer to Palestinian refugees, not Jews displaced from Arab countries. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel has launched a new international campaign entitled "I am a refugee". The purpose of the campaign is to increase international awareness of a little-known refugee group - Jewish refugees from Arab countries.

Before 1948 nearly one million Jews lived in the MENA region (Middle-East & North Africa) outside of the sc Brittish Palestinian mandate; after a half decade only few thousand were left. A documentary movie "The Forgotten Refugees" gives some background to these Jewish communities in the Great Middle East.

Wider context of the Refugee question in MENA

Thriving, prosperous Jewish communities existed in the Middle East and North Africa ( aka MENA region) a thousand years before the rise of Islam and more than 2500 years before the birth of the modern Arab nations. These communities, which extended from Iraq in the east to Morocco in the west, enjoyed a lively fabric of life and were influential in the local economies. Until the 10th century C.E., 90% of the world's Jews lived in regions now known as Arab countries.

On Nov. 29, 1947, the UN voted to partition then British-Mandate Palestine into two states: one Jewish, one Arab. Two states for two peoples. The Jewish population accepted that plan and declared a new state in its ancient homeland but the Arab inhabitants rejected the plan and launched a war of annihilation against the new Jewish state, joined by the armies of five Arab members of the UN. As a result of the war, there were Arabs who became refugees. Also following the declaration of the Jewish state antisemitism and anti-Jewish riots broke out in the Middle East and North Africa ( aka MENA region) and many Jews were driven from their homes - between 1948 and 1952, 856,000 Jews from Arab countries became refugees.

Every year the Palestinians are commemorating sc Nakba (catastrophe) Day, on which they remember the disaster that befell them in 1948, when they lost their war against Zionism and two-thirds of them were displaced from their homes, becoming refugees. While it is perfectly natural for the Palestinians to commemorate their national tragedy, the date they have chosen carries a clear political-ideological message, and it is not one that will encourage would-be Middle East peacemakers.

Besides humanitarian aspect I could mention an economic one too. In a recent conference "Justice for Jewish Refugees from Arab Countries" Dr. Stanley Urman, the executive director of Justice for Jews from Arab Countries, noted that Jewish refugees lost property worth $700 million (around $6 billion in today's terms ), while Palestinian refugees lost property worth about $450 million (around $3.9 billion in today's terms ). Since 1950, he said, Palestinian refugees have received $13.7 billion in U.N. funding, whereas Jewish refugees have received just $35,000. (Source Haaretz )

UNRWA – the never-ending mission

At least two aspects explain why there are still refugees after more than six decades:

  • First is Arab leaders' recalcitrance to accept their brethren and refusing to absorb the Palestinian refugees.
  • Second the United Nations created a separate agency - UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) - with unique principles and criteria.

According UNRWA criteria the refugee status is given not only to the original refugees whose normal place of residence was Palestine between June 1946 and May 1948, who lost their homes as a result of the 1948 Arab-Israeli conflict AND their descendants in the male line. So it isn't just the first generation that is entitled to this aid, as is the norm for all other refugees the United Nations helps, now the fifth generation is also entitled.

Originally UNRWA was established as a temporary agency. One motivation to agency's refugee definations might be economic aspect. An article "Palestinians Refugees Forever" in Haaretz gives following background:

UNRWA states that the Palestinians are occupied - indefinitely. UNRWA has financial and political interests in maintaining this fiction: as long as the Palestinians are refugees, UNRWA is in business. Of the 30,000 people that UNRWA employs, the vast majority are Palestinian: UNRWA is the largest single employer of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. Contrast this to the UN High Commission for Refugees, that only employs 5-6,000 people globally, and which focuses far more clearly on resettlement and rehabilitation of refugees and building new lives, and not on maintaining services that prop up the status quo. 

Refugees without agency

Millions of Germans who had lived in the Sudetenland and were kicked out at the end of WWII (3 years before 1948). They were not allowed to return and they are no longer refugees because Germany absorbed them. Finland settled some 10 % of its population from territories occupied by the Soviet Union, which from its side transferred new population to new regions. Around 45,000 Hungarians were deported from Czechoslovakia to Hungary, while around 72,000 Slovaks transferred from Hungary to Czechoslovakia, and they are no longer refugees either. Hundreds of thousands of Cypriots who were kicked out of their homes were also not allowed to go back to them, and they are no longer refugees because their fellow nationals on the other side of the island absorbed them.

One aspect with "right of return" should now be highlighted: A recent ruling by the European court of human rights declared that due to the time that had elapsed, Greek refugees expelled from northern Cyprus in 1974 would not be allowed to return to their homes. Now while, tiny Israel absorbed the Jewish refugees, but the vast Arab world not the Palestinian refugees – defined by unique UNRWA criteria – the discussion of "right to return" has so far been quite one-sided.

Israeli point of view

Earlier Israel's Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Danny Ayalon published his view in informative video "The Truth About the Refugees" explaining the historical facts relating to the issue of refugees in the Israeli Palestinian conflict.  This video also highlights the issue of the Jewish refugees who were forced out of their homes in the Arab world, and were subsequently absorbed by the State of Israel.

Organisation "Jews Indigenous to the Middle East and North Africa" ( JIMENA ) has completed their first comprehensive country specific websites about refugee issue.

My Conclusion

Unsolved Israeli-Palestinian conflict squanders resources which in more peaceful circumstances could be used for capacity building of civil societies. Keeping refugee question and land dispute on the top of their agenda Palestinian Authorities favor temporary solutions and relief instead of building more permanent institutions. On Israeli side the defense and security takes more and more resources, e.g one Iron Dome missile to drop one Quassam rocket costs nearly $ 100.000. Then there is also a question about effectiveness of foreign aid, but that is the other story outside the issue of this article (see e.g Placebo effect for people and society with 20 bn bucks).

In my opinion the Palestinian refugees should be rehabilitated in their place of residence just as the Jewish refugees were rehabilitated in theirs - Israel. There should be an immediate discontinuation of the perpetuation of the Palestinian refugee issue. The rehabilitation process implemented this way would minimize the demand for the "right of return" during peace talks so one problem less in agenda.  Sure few years ago there was a preliminary agreement about Palestine returns in Israel but the number was rather symbolic ( 5.000 ).  In any case the insistence of some Palestinian refugees to be given a right of return will be resolved by their immigration into the future Palestinian state that will be established through a peace agreement.

In my opinion the refugee problem described above has some similarities with situation in Serbia after Balkan wars. In Serbia still lives over 200.000 refugees and IDPs (internally displaced persons). Like return of Jews back to Arab countries, like return of Palestinians to Israel or West-Bank as well return of Serbs back to Croatia or Kosovo the numbers of returns are insignificant e.g due security reasons. From my point of view to solve refugee/IDP problem the rehabilitation process in the place of residence is good alternative and international aid should be redirected e.g towards effective housing programs instead of keeping alive unrealistic dreams about going back to square one.

¤¤¤ ¤¤¤ ¤¤¤

Out of Topic: Epilogue Lite

Article Source: http://www.articlesbase.com/politics-articles/israeli-vs-palestine-refugees-in-out-and-no-return-6202445.html

About the Author

Ari Rusila is a development project management expert and freelancer from Finland with a special interest in the Balkan region. His other interests include civil crisis management issues, EU external relations, North Black Sea region and middle East. His main blog including document library is Ari Rusila's BalkanBlog

Syria War in Details

U.S. Recycles Its Old Balkan Practice With Syria

Author: Ari Rusila

The Syrian rebellion began in earnest on March 11, 2011, when protests erupted. Since then, the conflict has become increasingly violent. About 70,000 people have died in the country's civil war over the past two years. Millions of people have been displaced, both internally and abroad. For months regional and Western capitals have officially held back on arming the rebels, in part out of fear that the weapons would fall into the hands of terrorists.


Now however U.S. has begun to support arms delivery to Syrian opposition with recycling its old practice in Balkans. Multiple planeloads (some estimates are up to 160 cargoplanes, 3,500 tn) of weapons have left Croatia since December 2012, when many Yugoslav weapons, previously unseen in the Syrian civil war, began to appear in videos posted by rebels on YouTube. Saudi Arabia has financed a large purchase of infantry weapons from Croatia and quietly funneled them to antigovernment fighters in Syria. American intelligence officers have helped the shipment with their earlier practice during Balkan wars. Earlier compared with the heavy weaponry employed by the Syrian regime, most of the equipment of Free Syrian Army (FSA) has been light so now the game is changing.

Photo credit NYT In Syria, a recoilless gun from the former Yugoslavia.

Photo credit The New York Times

Some foreign arms have been making their way to the Syrian opposition; the vast majority of guns were bought right from the regime - corrupt regime officials sold them. Another portion of their weapons was bought off the black market from Turkey or Jordan, which made them very expensive.

The opposition began as a secular struggle to overthrow the Assad regime. But many of the loosely linked brigades fighting the Assad regime have incorporated Islamist aims into their mission. These groups range from moderately Islamist outfits such as Liwaa al-Tawhid to more conservative groups such as Ahrar al-Sham, whose members have called for the countrywide implementation of Shariah, or Islamic law. There are also jihadist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN), which operates as an extension of al Qaeda's Iraqi franchise and has been declared a terrorist organization by the U.S. JAN boasts foreign connections and members with years of fighting experience, making them invaluable to the uprising.

Officially besides about $385 million in humanitarian aid has been disbursed by the U.S., there is an additional $115 million in nonlethal support for the fighters. On the other hand U.S. (unofficial) decision to send in more weapons is aimed at another fear in the West about the role of jihadist groups in the opposition. Such groups have been seen as better equipped than many nationalist fighters and potentially more influential. U.S. is covertly working to get those weapons into the right hands. Western officials agree that helping Syrian rebels defeat the brutal Assad regime is a worthwhile cause, but recent reports suggest some of that assistance has already benefited jihadist groups - e.g. JAN fighters have been using weapons originating in Croatia. (Sources: NYT , IBT , Debkafile)

Weapons from Croatia

"A conservative estimate of the payload of these flights would be 3,500 tons of military equipment"  (Hugh Griffiths, SIPRI, who monitors illicit arms transfers)

Persian Gulf states such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia have been orchestrating weapons shipments into the conflict for months. Weapons from the former Yugoslavia were spotted in Syria this winter, after a series of military cargo flights from Zagreb to Amman. The arms are typically sent to Turkey and shipped into Syria via ground transport. The airlift, which began on a small scale in early 2012 and continued intermittently through last fall, expanded into a steady and much heavier flow late last year, the data shows. It has grown to include more than 160 military cargo flights by Jordanian, Saudi and Qatari military-style cargo planes landing at Esenboga Airport near Ankara, and, to a lesser degree, at other Turkish and Jordanian airports. Also from Jordan and Turkey, trucks take the weapons to the border with Syria.


The below video posted by the jihadist group Ahrar al-Sham, a collection of various smaller groups based in the north of Syria, mainly around Idlib, Aleppo, and Hama, and not part of the Free Syrian Army, demonstrates that the Yugoslavian weapons - supplied via Croatia - being provided to FSA have now begun to reach the hands of jihadists. These include RBG-6 40mm grenade launcher , the M79 Osa rocket launcher, M79 rocket pods, Yugoslav-made recoilless gun, as well as other assault rifles, grenade launchers, machine guns, mortars and shoulder-fired rockets for use against tanks and armored vehicles.


http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uVvZVUPLhLE&feature=player_embedded #!

One should add that Croatia's Foreign Ministry and arms-export agency has denied that such shipments had occurred. Croatia, poised this year to join the European Union, now strictly adheres to international rules on arms transfers. However, export figures obtained by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) show that last December, Jordan suddenly began buying Croatian weapons.


The M79 Osa, an anti-tank weapon of Yugoslav origin, seized from Syria's opposition.

MLRS in Syria too?

On March 2013 Syrian rebels in Aleppo have begun receiving their first heavy weapons – 220-mm MLRS rocket launchers – from a large-scale supply operation headed by Saudi intelligence chief Prince Bandar bin Sultan. According Debkafile in Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia and Kosovo, his agents produced snapped up Russian-made MLRS (Smerch) and Hurricane 9K57 launchers capable of firing scores of 220-mm rockets to a distance of 70 kilometers.


Image shows a M60 recoilless gun being used to attack an army outpost,Hajez Barad, in Busr al-Harir, Daraa, on March 2nd.

The Saudi operation for shipping heavy rocket launchers from the Balkans to Aleppo is complicated. The rockets are fixed to vehicles weighing 43.7 tons each. The rockets themselves are 7.6 meters long and weigh 800 kilograms. To arrange the transfer of this heavy artillery to the rebels in Aleppo, Prince Bandar contacted Hakan Fidan, head of the MIT-Turkish National Intelligence Organization. They agreed to set up an overland route from the Balkans via Turkey and across the Syrian border to Aleppo, under the protection of the Turkish army.

It may be that Syrian rebels have now also the BM-30 Smerch (tornado), the most powerful multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) in the world. It was developed in the early 1980s and was accepted to service with the Soviet Army in 1987. It is also in service with Belarus and the Ukraine, and has been exported to Kuwait (27 systems) and Algeria (18 systems).India placed an order for an initial 38 systems. Deliveries began in May 2007.

I have some doubts how this Russian made MLRS has came from Croatia. First only one source (Debkafile) indicates so, second I don't have any confirmation that this system was for sale in Balkans, third some youtube videos from Syria which I have seen about this MLRS are so unclear that the queastion could be about some similar type of MLRS.


The heavy MLRS rocket launcher in Syrian rebel hands

Former Yugoslavia had three types of MLRS: M 63 Plamen(32 /128),M 77 Ogan(32/128) and M 87 Orkan(12/262) which was produced in cooperation with Iraq and army of Iraq used this system. The M87 Orkan (hurricane) is a MLRS, jointly developed by Yugoslavia and Iraq. Most of development was made in Yugoslavia and some manufacturing took place in Iraq. It was first publicly revealed in 1988 during defense exhibition in Iraq, labeled as the Ababil-50. The Orkan MLRS project was finished in the early 1990s due to collapse of the Yugoslavia and it is estimated that only few system were built. The most modern – 2011 - MLRS in Balkans is LRSVM, which is a modular self-propelled multitube rocket launch system developed by Serbia-based Vazduhoplovno Tehnicki Institut (VTI). Also Abu Dhabi's Emirates Defense Technologies (EDT) has developed, manufactured and delivered the first unit of the MLRS, which was designed and manufactured locally in UAE but in collaboration with a leading Serbian defence contractor. Perhaps some of these are now in operation theatre.

Aleppo is the key to win

The Saudi operation for shipping heavy rocket launchers from the Balkans to Aleppo is complicated. The rockets are fixed to vehicles weighing 43.7 tons each. The rockets themselves are 7.6 meters long and weigh 800 kilograms. To arrange the transfer of this heavy artillery to the rebels in Aleppo, Prince Bandar contacted Hakan Fidan, head of the MIT-Turkish National Intelligence Organization. They agreed to set up an overland route from the Balkans via Turkey and across the Syrian border to Aleppo, under the protection of the Turkish army.

On the other hand Russia brings down its cargo planes loaded with weapons and replacement parts for the Syrian army at Nairab air base attached to Aleppo's international air port, after the air facilities around Damascus were targeted by rebel fire. Recently Russian and Iranian arms lifts to Nairab were doubled, after rebels seized many Alawite villages in the Aleppo and Idlib regions of northern Syria.

The Saudis hope to expedite the rebel capture of the big Syrian Nairab air base attached to Aleppo's international air port. The Saudi prince has personally taken the Nairab battle under his wing, convinced that it is the key to the conquest of Aleppo, once Syria's national commercial and population center, after more than a year's impasse in the battle for its control. The fall of this air base would also substantially reduce the big Iranian and Russian airlifts to Assad's army. Moscow has since warned the rebels that if they attack incoming or outgoing Russian planes at Nairab, Russian special forces will come in to wipe out their strength around the base and take over its protection themselves.

U.S., Croatia and common history of clandestine operations

It is not surprising that U.S. is using Croatia for its clandestine operations. Radical Islam has enforced and widened their activities in Balkans last 15 years. During Bosnian war many foreign Islamists came to fight in mujahedeen brigade also many Al Quida figures – including Osama bin Laden – were supporting Bosnian Muslims 1990's. US took the side with these "freedom fighters" in Bosnia and later in Kosovo. US involvement in the Balkans is not about helping any of the people in the region -- Muslims, Croats, Serbs, or Albanians. The only interest of the Pentagon is in creating weak, dependent puppet regimes in order to dominate the entire region economically and politically.

In the 1980s Washington's secret services had assisted Saddam Hussein in his war against Iran. Then, in 1990, the US fought him in the Gulf. n both Afghanistan and the Gulf, the Pentagon had incurred debts to Islamist groups and their Middle Eastern sponsors. By 93 these groups, many supported by Iran and Saudi Arabia, were anxious to help Bosnian Muslims fighting in the former Yugoslavia and called in their debts with the Americans. Bill Clinton and the Pentagon were keen to be seen as creditworthy and repaid in the form of an Iran-Contra style operation - in flagrant violation of the UN Security Council arms embargo against all combatants in the former Yugoslavia.

The recent history of this issue in Balkans started in June 1993, when President Clinton received the head of the Saudi Arabian intelligence service, Prince Turki al Faisal - a close adviser to his uncle, the King. The Prince urged Clinton to take the lead in the military assistance to Bosnia. The American administration did not dare to do so: the fear of a rift within NATO was too great. However, the United States did consider the Saudi Arabian signal to be important, and therefore a new strategy was elaborated. Its architect was to be Richard Holbrooke, who started to look for a way to arm the Bosnian Muslims. In the summer of 1993, the Pentagon was said to have drawn up a plan for arms assistance to the Bosnian Muslim Army (ABiH), which included supplies of AK-47s and other small arms. This operation was to demand almost three hundred C-130 Hercules transport aircraft flights.The first consignment from Iran landed in Zagreb on 4 May 1994, with sixty tons of explosives and military equipment on board. The arms were transported in Croatian army trucks along the Adriatic coast to Bosnia. Because the supplies attracted too much attention at Pleso Airport in Zagreb, the flights subsequently went mainly to the Croatian island of Krk. Shortly after Iranian cargo aircraft had landed there, a number of Croatian helicopters arrived to continue transporting the load after dusk.

In the summer and autumn of 1994 plans were elaborated for training the ABiH. An US 'mercenary outfit' was to arrange this training. This was carried out by Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI), a company based in Virginia that employed various retired American generals and intelligence officials. With the consent of the State Department, MPRI trained the Hrvatska Vojska (HV, the Croatian Army) and later also the ABiH. MPRI's role arose from the signing of the agreement between the United States and Croatia on military collaboration. By engaging MPRI, Washington also reduced the danger of 'direct' involvement. The CIA settled on 14,000 tons between May 1994 and December 1996. According to the State Department from May 1994 to January 1996 Iran delivered a total of 5000 tons of arms and ammunition via the Croatian pipeline to Bosnia. (Source Bill Clinton's Bastard Army by Ares Demertzis ,Feb. 2009 in New English Review)

Links between drug trafficking and the supply of arms to the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) were established also mid-90s. In West KLA was described as terrorist organization but when US selected them as their ally it transformed organization officially to "freedom" fighters. After bombing Serbia 1999 KLA leaders again changed their crime clans officially to political parties. This public image however can not hide the origins of money and power, old channels and connections are still in place in conservative tribe society.

Assad is not the only war criminal

Reports of a chemical weapon attack in Syria's Aleppo Province end of March 2013 provoked leaders and politicians, particularly in the West, to advocate more fiercely for the overthrow of the Assad regime, despite the vague details surrounding the attack. Current data seem to suggest, however, that it was not government forces behind the attack, but rebel forces.The attack, intelligence sources appear to agree, was launched by rebel fighters and not government forces. Since the victims were overwhelmingly the Syrian military, this was not a huge shock, but is important to reiterate. Likewise, the Assad forces called upon the United Nations to launch an investigation into the attack.

Last October 2012, the rebel forces were responsible for four suicide bombings in Aleppo that killed approximately 40 civilians and wounded many more. Jebhat al-Nusra, a group linked to al-Qaeda, has taken credit for the bombings. Additionally, the rebels were also responsible for the massacre of over 90 people in Houla last year. Immediately following that event, the U.S., France, Great Britain, and Germany blamed Assad for the killings and expelled Syria's ambassadors from their countries in protest. Later reports, however, pointed to evidence that the massacre was in fact carried out by anti-Assad rebel forces.

From the other side Iranian supplies are what keep Assad's army functioning and his regime in Damascus and other Syrian towns able to survive the rebellion. Iraqi Al Qaeda is also preparing to push trucks loaded with Chlorine gas-CI trucks into Syria for the jihadists to use against Assad's forces. U.S. has been unable to persuade Iraq cut short the Iranian airlift and land route through his country to Bashar Assad of weapons, fighters and cash.

From my point of view it remains to see if this newest U.S. clandestine recycling operation has better success that earlier in Balkans, Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya … I doubt.


Article Source: http://www.articlesbase.com/politics-articles/us-recycles-its-old-balkan-practice-with-syria-6533171.html

About the Author

Ari Rusila is a development project management expert and freelancer from Finland with a special interest in the Balkan region. His other interests include civil crisis management issues, EU external relations, North Black Sea region and middle East. His main blog including document library is Ari Rusila's BalkanBlog


Iranian Revolution

Causes and Perceptions of the 1979 Iranian Revolution

Author: Alana Blumenthal

The varied factors leading to the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, and those that led foreign governments to consider the events as an "intelligence failure," stem in equal parts from the cultures and the individuals involved.  Powerful personalities like Mohammad Reza Shah and Ayatollah Ruhollah Moosavi Khomeini certainly played impressive roles in this political upheaval, yet one cannot forget the equally forceful activities of the average Iranian.  Equally, with its millennia of rich governmental history, Persia provides an intricate backdrop for intrigue.  However, the region serves as a keystone between the Eastern and Western worlds, and as such its fate is inextricably linked to the policies and actions of foreign powers, as has been the case arguably since the first Western conquest by Alexander of Macedonia in 330BCE.  A fundamental key in understanding the context for the rapid success of the revolutionary movement in Iran is the nature of the country, its culture, and its people.  Many aspects of the Iranian worldview differ from that of the Western observer in a way that makes it hard for Americans to understand the widespread support for governmental upheaval. 

Iran, formerly Persia, has arguably the longest tradition of continual centralized leadership, one that is dominated by the legacies of conquest and foreign control.  This instability and internal discord had an effect on the Iranian psyche, both positively and negatively.  While it creates strong cultural currents of nationalism, individualism, and pragmatism, it also breeds paranoia, egotism, and a dependence on authoritarian leadership.  This lack of extended generational leadership also results in a very fluid social hierarchy, wherein a soldier may easily become a king and a king an outcast, as in the case of Reza Shah.  As a result, there is a lack of distinction between the expectations for the behavior of king or commoner, and each is wary of the other's intentions.  Therefore, it is considered quotidian that leaders should mistrust their subjects' loyalty and willingness to support the state; and the populace equally is reluctant to believe the integrity of promises made by their rulers.  Indeed, unlike in Western culture it is in no way hypocritical for an Iranian to publicly acclaim policies which he is known to privately denounce, merely polite.  In such a society, one of the highest shows of skill and savvy is the successful conduct of intrigue and conspiracy.  (Amuzegar, 103)

Additionally, it is a culture that, since its intellectual and economic decline around 1200CE, has looked to the past for models of an idealized society.  This is a concept with which Americans constantly struggle, since it is a complete contradiction of the ideology that strives toward an undefined utopian future and actively disregards the examples of the past.  This, perhaps, is why Western powers, and even the Westernized Shah, failed to anticipate that the revolution would favor a return to Islamic rule and Sharia law.  For the majority of Iranians in the mid-seventies, the glorious example of past success to aspire to was the rise and expansion of Islamic power.  Although Islam began in what is now Saudi Arabia, the Shiite majority in Iran views the period after the conquest of Persia as central to their religious identity.  This same tenet, sanctifying the succession of Imams that began with Ali, encourages Shiite Muslims to identify one man as supreme ruler of all the faithful.  Until the return of the "Hidden Imam," any secular political leader is tolerated, but considered secondary to the authority of the clerics. (Bozeman, 391)   This belief has been consistent in Iranian government since the seventh century, including a legal validation in the 1906 constitution allowing any law passed to be overturned if a religious authority deemed it "unislamic."  Since the combination of secular administration and Islamic principle in Iran after the conquest, Ayatollahs have incited revolutions against any Shah proclaimed to violate religious decrees, which traditionally serve as direct evaluations of the leader.  (Shawcross, 111)

            Despite his attraction to Western culture, Mohammad Reza Shah embodied many of the essential Iranian characteristics and traditions.  In conducting government affairs he was highly independent, often failing to consult his advisors or even the parliament.  He was also defined by his paranoia, investing billions of dollars in military development and instituting internal security measures against perceived threats.  Additionally, he was fascinated with the nation's past, although he wished to revive the period of the Persian, rather than Islamic, Empire.  Like his father, Mohammad Reza Shah saw definite parallels between his dynasty and that of Cyrus and Darius.  The trajectory of his kingship mimicked that Darius in many ways.  Mohammad Shah's father had united the region under a popular ruler, and he used the newly achieved central authority to pour money into public works and modernization projects.  Mohammad Shah did all that he could to emphasize these similarities, including the elaborate and somewhat infamous international summit held at Persepolis, the seat of power for the first Persian Empire.  The final irony was that he was also the second and last ruler in his empire's succession, Darius having been defeated and replaced by Alexander of Macedonia, who later burnt the palace at Persepolis to the ground.

Perhaps similar to Darius, Mohammad Shah lived and led in the shadow of his dynamic and forceful father.  As a child, he was encouraged to favor military might rather than formal education, since Reza Shah viewed this as the reason behind his sweeping success against the Qajar dynasty.  This strict upbringing, in combination with the aforementioned attributes of the Iranian worldview, contributed to the highly discussed personality traits of the controversial Shah of Shahs.  Yet unlike his father, he was unable to balance the power with the necessities of monarchy in many ways.  Insecurity was so central to his character that one of his courtiers would make the comparison, "that Reza Shah was a man to whom no one dared lie.  With his son, no one dared to tell the truth."  (Shawcross, 34)  This powerful and eventually destructive insecurity also had roots in the economy of Iran during the latter portion of Mohammad Reza Shah's reign.  As a stubbornly independent autocrat, he held almost complete control over the designation of the nation's vast wealth of newly acquired petrodollars.  As a result, after 1971 the small faction of external and internal contacts with the Shah who had remained honest with him on matters of policy steadily decreased.  Courtiers and foreign representatives alike found it in their best interest to flatter and support him in return for better chances at receiving their share of the money being spent as rapidly as it was earned.  (Shawcross, 48)  In the case of the foreign powers, this proved an example of realpolitik at its most short-sighted.  The reluctance of friendly nations such as France and the United States to attempt to advise the Shah against overextension and unwise spending habits contributed to the downfall of a major ally in their foreign policies.

In addition to his self-sufficient/paranoid aspect, Mohammad Reza Shah also had a dichotomous tendency towards a perception of invincibility.  Having survived a number of illnesses as a child and a series of assassination attempts as king, Mohammad Shah held a belief that God approved of him and his authority throughout his adult life.  The major turning point in his allowing this belief to overwhelm political reality came in 1953, when a failed attempt by his Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq to oust him saw him exiled, resulting in a popular outcry for his return to restore order to the nation.  He was later noted as considering this as a moment of inspiration for his later autocratic behavior.  Before 1953, he understood himself as a hereditary sovereign; after his return, he believed he was an elected ruler with the mandate of the people.  (Shawcross, 72)  In a way, this made him a confident leader, who theoretically would have defended his government against any and all conflicts by a tendency towards self-preservation.  However, the opposite occurred in what might be attributed to an overestimation of himself and his support system.  In an interview given to an American reporter in June of 1978, he firmly declared that, "nobody can overthrow me.  I have the support of 700,000 troops, all the workers, and most of the people.  I have the power."  (Amuzegar, 224)  Instead of fighting to preserve this sense of divine and popular approval of his right to lead, he allowed it to overwhelm his judgment and in essence leave him defenseless. 

It is, of course, an injustice to Mohammad Reza Shah, who ruled Iran for 37 years, to depict only the negative qualities.  As previously mentioned, he, like all Iranians, possessed also the positive attributes associated with individualism, ambition, and political prudence, and these in fact led to great advancements in Iranian infrastructure and society under his direction.  However, for the sake of this argument, focusing on those factors that contributed to the Iranian revolution, these negative aspects possess the most relevance.  A major part of the Shah's negative image resulted from his complicated relationship with Western powers.  He constantly attempted to separate himself from nations like England and the United States due to their general unpopularity in Iran.  Yet despite this outward obstinance, he was almost cripplingly dependant on their material and moral aid, a reliance that ironically increased concomitantly with his belief in his internal support. Both psychological phenomena occurred after 1953, and it is worthwhile to examine briefly the events of that period in order to better understand the behavior of the Shah in 1979.

As Mohammad Mossedeq gained more power and support through the parliamentary grant of "emergency powers," the Shah became increasingly upset and confused, and he looked to English and American officials for advice.  One report, a collaboration between American and British intelligence, identified Mohammad Reza Shah in 1952 as, "aware of the communist danger, but vacillating and weak.  Recently he has showed himself to be too easily swayed by Mossadeq's threats."  (Shawcross, 64)  In attempt to strengthen the Shah's determination, a number of international figures extended informal support for him against the powerful Prime Minister.  The varied responses he received set in his mind an unrealistic precedent for the extent to which the international community would be willing to support him.  Winston Churchill, through the American Ambassador Loy Henderson, extended reassurances of the two nations' commitment to his reign.  Still, the American and British reactions were dualistic at best.  Even Churchill's message exemplified this diplomatic ambiguity when he said, "While we do not interfere in Persian politics, we should be very sorry to se the Shah driven out."  (Shawcross, 66)  This only aggravated the Shah's already acute insecurities, and in combination with his exclusion from Operation Ajax he became convinced that England was part of the actions against him, similar to their replacement of the Qajar dynasty with his father.  As a result, he took little initiative in combating the growing internal dissent.

In the end, the coup against Mossadeq succeeded only due to the intervention of the CIA and MI6, largely because of the conservative leanings of the governments at that time and their determination to prevent Iran from falling into the Communist sphere of influence.  This reality has serious implications for our understanding of the events of the Islamic revolution in 1979, in that it formed contrasting opinions between the Shah and the general population as to his relationship with the Western powers.  As Henry Kissinger explained, "One of the reasons for the Shah's progressive demoralization was his very real doubt whether we were actually supporting him.  He certainly had the means at his disposal to resist more strenuously than he did.  And he chose not to exercise them because he must have had doubts about our real intentions."  (Shawcross, 152) By 1977, Mohammad Shah truly believed that the discord was being sown by the West as a response to some unknown affront he must have committed.  He theorized that England may still harbor resentment about the nationalization of oil that cut their profits from the region, or that perhaps the Americans were planning to sacrifice him as part of a separate peace with the USSR.  In his mind, the revolutionary movement was too well organized to be the product of internal forces, and therefore the means by which he tried to stop it included offering appeasements to England and the United States rather than focusing on his domestic policies.  (Amuzegar, 80)  Ultimately, this backfired, resulting in a much more rapid and confident revolutionary movement.

Much of the lack of internal response stemmed from the fluctuation of use of what Kissinger referred to as the "means at his disposal."  Here he is discussing the Savak, the Iranian intelligence and enforcement community, which was also a direct result of the 1953 experience and the Western reaction. Savak served as the intellectual descendant to the "eyes and ears of the king," a system of proto-intelligence agents that operated under Darius during the Persian Empire.  However, there were very few actual parallels between the modern organization and its ancient model.  Trained by the CIA and Mossad, Savak was in practice far more interested in the bureaucratic and enforcement aspects of their mission than in actual intelligence gathering.  Additionally they, under the close direction of the Shah, were entirely preoccupied by eliminating the Tudeh party, the communist element in Iran, instead of trying to discern all of the internal networks, particularly the Islamist groups, which proved far more capable of inciting revolution.  They also failed to gauge the extent of dissatisfaction with the regime amongst the general population, largely because of their tactic of targeting individual members instead of infiltrating groups and identifying the central leadership.  (Amuzegar, 167) 

The final failure of Savak resulted from the Shah's characteristic confusion when deciding on a policy concerning their actions.  As part of his designs for Iran becoming a Westernized, egalitarian society, the Shah began to reduce the violent aspects of his security network.  However, he chose a disastrous time to do so, arguably because he believed that this would ingratiate him to the Western nations and convince them to come to his aid.  Had he remembered the soothing words of Winston Churchill, he may have behaved differently.   Churchill had advised him that, "It is the duty of a constitutional monarch or president when faced with violent tyrannical action by individuals or a minority party to take the necessary steps to secure the well-being of the toiling masses and the continuity of an ordered state."  (Shawcross, 66)  Instead, through his "liberalization" policy he eradicated the highly controversial extra-legal powers of the Savak, which infuriated its members to the extent that they began participating in and even inciting riots "in order to teach the monarch a lesson."  (Amuzegar, 168)  The major flaw in his plan occurred in the aftermath of the September 8 protests and what became known as Black Friday.  After a huge outcry arose against the regime for the declaration of martial law and the killings of dozens of protesters, the Shah reversed his decision.  He opted for a more humanitarian route, ordering that security forces no longer fire upon demonstrators under any circumstances.  The people soon realized the implications of this, and often taunted the officers.  Ultimately, leaders of the revolutionary movement mistook this act of appeasement as one of surrender, and thereby encouraged even more rapid and vehement measures against the government.  (Zonis, 590)  The Shah's inconsistency not only failed to prevent, but also even precipitated his own downfall.

It was the failure of Savak and more importantly of Mohammad Reza Shah himself to understand the attitudes of the population that brought the government to such a weakened position by 1978-1979.  By that point, antipathy towards the Shah and his rule characterized nearly every faction of Iranian society, creating allies amongst otherwise ideologically inconsistent demographics.  Religious and secular, elite, middle-class, and poor, all felt that their lives and their country was worse for Mohammad Reza Shah's influence.  The most vocal of these discontented groups, as in any society, was the educated youth.  The typical cynicism and mistrust of these young men was exacerbated in a culture distinguished for its high perception of injustice stemming from an easy disillusionment with individual leaders.  Yet the people certainly needed some justification for upheaval other than a simple propensity towards dissension, and the Shah undeniably provided ample provocation.  Unfortunately, many of the perceived affronts were in fact part of the effort of the Shah to modernize his country and improve the quality of life of its citizens, issues which he considered a personal crusade as well as a guaranteed way to ingratiate himself to both his subjects and the international community.

The 1960's and ‘70's in Iran saw a dramatic influx of money as a result of the nation's wealth of oil reserves.  It also saw the grandiose plans of the Shah's White Revolution, a plan to modernize the country through land reform, large-scale urban development, and extension of civil liberties to women and other previously disenfranchised groups.  Portions of this program, which included the replacement of the traditional calendar dating from the Hegira with one that focused on the reign of Cyrus, wer in blatant disregard of the majority Shiite population by its secular leader.  On a more commercial level, it aggrieved most of the people the Shah hoped to help: the youth, middle class merchants, and political activists.  (Shawcross, 195)  In general, nearly every section of society was of the opinion that the White Revolution was merely a pretext for increasing the role of the central government in their daily operations.  With all of these groups against him, he essentially lost the support of the illiterate peasantry in the country and the educated elite in the city at once.  Their leadership, religious clerics and wealthy businessmen, would prove strange but effective bedfellows in the movement to depose the Shah.  (Zonis, 592)

The general consensus is that the Shah simply tried to progress too quickly in a region that observes change on a millennial scale.  Land prices skyrocketed as the government bought up land for development, driving businessmen and tenets alike out of their homes and often leaving them bankrupt.  Workers were imported into the city to build magnificent homes and skyscrapers, meanwhile spending their nights in shanty towns and sometimes even in holes in the ground.  As the British Ambassador Anthony Parsons observed, a large contributory factor in the popular uprising was the enormous influx of laborers, young and impoverished men with no roots in the community and therefore no reason to avoid confrontations.  (Shawcross, 27)  Politically, the Shah's policies were contradictory at best.  In 1967, he wrote that, "Censorship and suppression of liberty for no part of our plans…we will take no such authoritarian measures…and at no time must the means of attaining our goal be in conflict with the individual's right of belief and freedom."  (Amuzegar, 149)  However, in 1975 he abolished the state's opposition party in favor of the single Rastakhiz party, without following the legal procedure of consulting the parliament; nor did he reach out to any of his advisors in making this decision.  (Alam, 415)  The Shah expected people to be exuberant over free elections and universal suffrage, but instead they viewed his actions as another way to advance the interests of his relatives and courtiers above those of the people, as he had by driving up the value of land.

 Despite all of the attention paid to internal security and policies by the Shah, many argue that it was still inadequate when compared to his focus on foreign military and diplomatic affairs.  His personal political insecurities made him constantly suspicious of intrigue from neighboring countries as well as the major powers.  In order to combat the immediate geopolitical risks, he constantly sought the most advanced weaponry manufactured in the United States.  It was an apparent obsession, and he frequently tested new presidents by attempting to renegotiate the limits on his spending, striking the most satisfactory deal with Richard Nixon for billions of dollars in return for the newest airplanes and tracking systems.  However, this directly violated warnings dating back to 1961, when John W. Bowling of the US State Department noted that the Shah needed to abandon this "near-obsession" with military development in order to effectively manage increasing internal pressure.  (Zonis, 587)  Nine years later, the U.S. Bureau of Intelligence and Research concluded that, "Iran could not afford extensive new arms purchases and still maintain the level of economic development that the Shah deems necessary for political stability…Increased military spending could thus lessen rather than enhance Iranian security."  (Shawcross, 158)  By the time President Carter opted to act on these and similar precautionary documents, the situation had deteriorated sufficiently that they could no longer prove adequate.

Carter was not the first foreign leader to understand the precarious nature of Iranian politics and the monarch who embodied them.  When John F. Kennedy met with Nikita Khrushchev in 1961, the Russian leader informed him of the looming danger surrounding the Shah's position.  Khrushchev identified the incompatibility of the Shah's self-image and the reality of public perception, observing that the Shah viewed himself as endowed with a divine right to leadership that would overcome any adversary.  He astutely remarked that the Shah's power rested on the military success of his father, not on divine grace, and that this was surely how his subjects viewed him.  Khrushchev explained to Kennedy that he found it inevitable that Iran would undergo major upheaval, resulting in its conversion into a part of the soviet sphere.  President Kennedy was humbled by these observations, and immediately ordered an intelligence estimate to verify them.  The report concluded that, "profound political and social change in one form or another is virtually inevitable," and that such change was most likely to come through a revolutionary movement.  (Shawcross, 85)  As a result of these revelations, Kennedy acted quickly to reform the policy on Iran, enacting proactive measures to diagnose potential threats and intervene where necessary.

Given the clarity an insight of understanding nearly two decades before the revolution actually succeeded, how is it that history views the event as sudden and unpredictable?  Sources concede that intelligence circles throughout the democratic and communist worlds still found the idea of a successful revolution inconceivable in 1978.  In fact, only two reports, one Israeli and one French, mentioned the serious danger ahead for the Shah, and these went virtually unnoticed.  (Amuzegar, 12)  The general belief of diplomats in Tehran in 1978 was that the Shah would not need their countries' support, that internal security would handle the unrest.  The majority believed that the Shah still held the loyalty of the influential middle class, that they were merely adjusting to the details of the "liberalization" policy and would gradually accept it with proper encouragement from the central government.  The most glaring mistake was the accepted opinion that the revolutionary forces, particularly the religious factions, were poorly organized and largely ineffective.  (ibid., 229) 

Had intelligence in the region been more thorough, diplomats would have recognized rapidly that reality was the exact opposite of their assumptions.  Networks of bazaar businessmen and local clerics provided the ideological and financial wealth sufficient to make a truly organized, efficient revolution.  As Israeli Ambassador Uri Lubran recalled, "the only organized infrastructure which had leeway to operate within the country was the religious community."  (Shawcross, 276)  This dilemma was exacerbated by the Shah, who had already strengthened the religious movement by proscribing a nearly all other political outlets, when he chose to give approval for France to accept the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini.  In his new, Western base, the Ayatollah had access to the most modern amenities, allowing him to phone his speeches directly to his supports in Iran, who would record and immediately distribute them throughout the country.  France also gave him an increased level of credibility, as if he were a foreign dignitary rather than an exiled priest.  In October of 1978, the perception became solidified as leaders of the secular opposition movements like Mahdi Bazargan visited the Ayatollah in France to officially endorse him as the head of the national anti-Shah movement.  This act allayed the fears of the middle-class bazaar merchants that a government without the Shah would be moderate and would not result in chaos.  (Stempel, 50)  The middle class, depended upon for support by foreign diplomats as well as the Shah, had now committed themselves to a revolution under Khomeini. 

Part of the failure to understand the immediacy of the revolution, at least in the case of the Americans, was symptomatic of diplomatic communities throughout the world: they were isolated from the population they needed to observe.  The American Embassy in Tehran is a perfect example of this systematic communication failure.  Purchased in 1928 from a wealthy family who used it as a country home, the building began as an ideal compound suitable for dignitaries and resting just beyond the city limits.  However, as the population boomed and the city expanded, the urban area spread to surround the walls of the lavish complex.  The effect was that American diplomats were removed completely from a population only a few feet away from them, who largely resented the luxury of their lifestyle.  Additionally, the Shah was strict concerning whom representatives of friendly nations could meet.  In order to maintain a favorable relationship with the Shah, most of the American officials living in Iran obeyed his order and did not pursue meetings with non-diplomatic or anti-Shah elements.  (Shawcross, 263)  With these crippling limitations, it becomes more apparent why U.S. intelligence on Iran in the months leading to the overthrow of the Shah contained so many oversights and false assumptions.

However, the problem with American intelligence on Iran in the mid and late 1970's depended on more than physical isolation; it resulted from an ideological separation as well.  The American approach to what Adda Bozeman refers to as "strategic thinking" is ahistorical, valuing an estimate of current situations and relies very minimally on understanding the cultural and geopolitical traditions in a given region.  The drawback of this attitude is that its outcomes are equally fleeting as its assessments.  As seen in Iran, it leads to immediate rather than lasting allies.  Additionally, it often fails to allow for constructive advice in times of upheaval, since it cannot anticipate trends or underlying motivations.  (Bozeman, 402)  American understanding of international events also assumes certain universalities that simply do not exist.  It views religion as secondary in government and Westernizing/modernizing actions as inherently favorable.  As discussed at the beginning of this argument, neither of these beliefs translates into Iranian culture.

Perhaps if Western intelligence possessed a better understanding of the full extent of Iranian/Persian history and its impact on the modern mentality, they could have foreseen and even prevented the expulsion of the Shah in favor of an Islamist regime.  Certainly, the event brought about a shift in Middle East policies, finally alerting the West to the fact that one must consider religious issues alongside political and economic factors when assessing the Islamic world.  This, in turn, leads to a reevaluation of the emphasis placed on human rights in countries obedient to the Sharia.  As Bozeman explained in late 1979, "it is not only illusional but counterproductive to make "human rights" the focus of our foreign policy [in the Middle East.]"  (Bozeman, 391)  The inability of U.S. policy makers to grasp this essential incongruity meant that, even granted access to individuals outside of the Shah's court, it is unlikely that they could have recognized the scope of revolutionary activities and their repercussions.

Still, it is important to remember that we now view the Iranian revolution as a fait accompli, and this makes it easy to analyze the failure of those involved.  As Henry Kissinger points out, he could remember an interview where he posited that, "a rate of economic advance like Iran's was bound to lead to revolution.  But it was an idle musing, for I added immediately that apparently the momentum of a very rapid rate of growth could overcome the political perils of industrialization.  I was wrong."  (Shawcross, 275)  History may very well look back on the events of 1979 and see them more as a startling combination of erroneous actions, rather than the successes of revolutionary methods.  Had the Shah been more connected with his people's demands, had the foreign powers chosen to intervene or provide encouragement, had the various factions chosen infighting over unity, Iran might have remained a constitutional monarchy.  That, however, is exactly why it is the duty of diplomats and intelligence officers to appreciate as much as possible about the situation in a given country, so that it does not become the responsibility of the historian to analyze what might have happened.


  1. Alam, Asadollah. The Shah and I: The Confidential Diary of Iran's Royal Court, 1969-1977. C. New York: St. Martin's Press. 1991
  2. Amuzegar, Jahangir. The Dynamics of Revolution. C. Albany: State University of New York. 1991
  3. Bozeman, Adda. "Iran: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Tradition of Persian Statecraft." Orbis, pp 387-402. Summer 1979
  4. Shawcross, William. The Shah's Last Ride. C. New York: Simon and Schuster. 1988
  5. Stempel, John D. Inside the Iranian Revolution. C. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1981
  6. Zonis, Marvin. "Iran: A Theory of Revolution from Accounts of the Revolution." World Politics vol. 35, no. 4, pp 586-606. July, 1983

Article Source: http://www.articlesbase.com/news-and-society-articles/causes-and-perceptions-of-the-1979-iranian-revolution-4270666.html

About the Author

Alana Blumenthal is an historian with a B.A. from Sarah Lawrence College.


Protests continue in Ukraine - Rivalry between Russia and the EU

         Protests in Ukraine continue since November. The country seems tightened between two powers; European Union and Russia. Last declarations from Europe, Herman Van Rompuy was in favor of the protesters, Van Rompuy specified that the  future of Ukraine is with European Union whereas Russia side Sergei Lavrov criticised protesters and surprised with European Union defending the vandals.

         Ukraine has already been an important issue between the two powers.  Both side consider the region as the gate of their security including Romania and Bulgaria. The latter have been gathered by the EU and Ukraine is now last fortificcation for Russia.

         Russia’s  historical imperial interest still continue on Ukraine. The country is divided nto two segments: Russia supporters and the ones aiming to enter to the EU.